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Abstract
Background. The Limited Strength model [3] of
cognitive psychology predicts that human capacity
to exert cognitive effort is limited and that decision
making is impeded once high depletion is reached.
Aim. We investigate how password choice differs
between depleted and undepleted users.
Method. Two groups of 50 subjects each were
asked to generate a password. One group was
cognitively depleted, the other was not. Password
strength was measured and compared across groups.
Results. Using a stepwise linear regression we
found that password strength is predicted by deple-
tion level, personality traits and mood, with an over-
all adjusted R2 = .206. The depletion level was the
strongest predictor of password strength (predictor
importance .371 and p = .001). Participants with
slight effortful exertion created significantly better
passwords than the undepleted control group. Par-
ticipants with high depletion created worse pass-
words than the control group.
Conclusions. That strong depletion diminishes the
capacity to choose strong passwords indicates that
cognitive effort is necessary for the creation of
strong passwords. It is surprising that slight exertion
of cognitive effort prior to the password creation
leads to stronger passwords. Our findings open up
new avenues for usable security research through
deliberately eliciting cognitive effort and replenish-
ing after depletion and indicate the potential of in-
vestigating personality traits and current mood.
1 Introduction
Users often set easy-to-remember passwords con-
structed for example from their wife’s name, or
recycle and re-use passwords across services [1].
These are predictable and easily guessed. This is
because the panoply of separate services mean that
users have a list of accounts to manage each with
their own login credentials. However, managing
and remembering a large number of complex pass-
words remain a challenge. So far, the question
has not been addressed how users create passwords
when they are cognitively tired or depleted. In fact,
it is an open question whether cognitive effort is
necessary for the creation of strong passwords.
The limited strength model of cognitive psychol-
ogy states that human capacity to exert cognitive ef-
fort is limited and that decisions as well as effort-
ful tasks are impeded under cognitive depletion [2].
We report on a study with N = 100 participants de-
signed to measure the strength of passwords set by
cognitively depleted versus non-depleted users. We
hypothesise H1: Cognitively depleted users create
weaker passwords than non-depleted users.
We replicate existing methods from cognitive
psychology [3, 2, 20, 31] to induce cognitive de-
pletion, in particular with thought suppression, im-
pulse control and cognitively effortful tasks. We
check depletion manipulation via a Brief Mood In-
ventory [31]. We measure password strength across
groups using a password meter. We evaluate the im-
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pact of cognitive depletion on password strength.
Contribution. Our findings indicate that slight
exertion of cognitive effort leads to significantly
better passwords than an undepleted control group.
High depletion leads to worse passwords than an
undepleted control group. This is the first study to
show the impact of cognitive effort and depletion on
password creation. It highlights an important factor
for password and usable security research that has
not been addressed to date.
2 Background
This section looks at literature on password
strengths in relation to users’ ability to set and re-
member them. We then introduce cognitive effort
and explain the state of ego depletion. Lastly we re-
view how affect and personality traits influence de-
pletion states and decisions.
2.1 Strength & Memorability
The use of text usernames and passwords is the
cheapest and most commonly used method of com-
puter authentication. The average user has 6.5 pass-
words, each shared across 3.9 different sites, each
user has 25 accounts requiring passwords and type
8 passwords per day [12]. Users have to not only
remember the passwords but also the system and
userid associated, which password restriction apply
to which system and whether they have changed a
password and what they have changed it to [1].
Recalling strong passwords is a humanly impos-
sible task since non-meaningful items are inherently
difficult to remember [27]. When forced to comply
to security policies such as monthly password reset,
a large number of users are frustrated [18]. They
use strategies such as writing passwords down, in-
crementing the number in the password at each reset
[1], storing passwords in electronic files and reusing
or recycling old passwords [18]. While it is possi-
ble to create strong and meaningful passwords us-
ing pseudo-random combinations of letters, num-
bers and characters that are meaningful only to the
owner [35], four to five passwords are the most a
typical user can be expected to use effectively [1].
Thus memory issues impede the strength of pass-
word chosen by the user. To help users in set-
ting strong passwords and aid memorability, graph-
ical passwords have been proposed. Methods such
as draw-a-secret are an improvement on usability
of password authentication. Password strength is
improved too as even a small subset of graphical
passwords constitutes a much larger password space
than dictionaries of textual passwords [19]. They
work on the principle that humans can remember
pictures better than text [29]. However no research
has investigated how effortful setting password is
for the user nor how depletion states impact pass-
word choice and subsequent memorability.
2.2 Cognitive Effort and Depletion
Human beings have a limited store of cogni-
tive energy or capacity [2]. Self-control tasks,
choice and decision-making draw from this inner
resource. Tasks requiring self-control tasks span
across spheres such as controlling attention, emo-
tions, impulses, thoughts and cognitive processing,
choice and volition and social processing [3]. In
general, all tasks that are cognitively effortful—and
thereby System 2 in the terminology of the dual-
process model—draw from the limited cognitive en-
ergy. As a muscle that gets tired with exertion, self-
control tasks cause short-term impairments in sub-
sequent self-control tasks. This is termed a state of
ego depletion or cognitive depletion. There are lev-
els of depletion beyond which individuals may be
unable to control themselves effectively, regardless
of what is at stake [3] and in unrelated sphere of
activity [2]. This phenomenon has been observed
in areas of over-eating, -drinking, -spending, under-
achievement, and sexuality [3].
An underlying question of this research is
whether the creation of strong passwords is a cogni-
tively effortful task. If that is the case, then we ex-
pect to observe that the creation of passwords is im-
paired under cognitive depletion. On such an obser-
vation, we can further conclude that cognitive effort
is necessary for password creation. Given that cog-
nitive depletion permeates different activities and is
yielded by a variety of self-control tasks, we can
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therefore expect that password creation will be im-
paired by the user’s other effortful activities.
2.2.1 Beliefs
In this context, it is an important question whether
all people are equally cognitively depleted. Inter-
estingly, a person’s beliefs have an influence on the
level of that person’s cognitive depletion. There is a
line of research in (motivational) psychology inves-
tigating the impact of beliefs on the nature of human
attributes. A classical example is the belief whether
intelligence is fixed or malleable [5, 10]. It turns out
that implicit beliefs about willpower as a limited re-
source [20] impact the extent of cognitive depletion.
Consequently, individuals who believe in unlimited
willpower are less affected by cognitive depletion.
This effect impacts our experiment because partic-
ipants are not equally affected by the manipulation
inducing cognitive depletion, and we expect to see
differing depletion levels in the experiment group.
2.2.2 Personality Traits
While beliefs or mindsets of persons constitute per-
sonality traits already, we expect other personality
traits to influence the capacity to bear cognitive ef-
fort as well as the strength of chosen passwords.
Capacity theories of self-control conceptualise it as
a dispositional trait like construct that differ across
individuals. Thus people high in dispositional self-
control will have more resources at their disposal
than individuals lower in trait self-control. In addi-
tion, certain people are dispositionally motivated to
act in a certain way such as over-eating, -drinking.
Personality traits has already been linked with secu-
rity research, for example impulsive individuals are
more likely to fall for phishing e-mails while trait-
based susceptibility to social engineering attacks is
recognised [32].
2.2.3 Affect
Security tasks including password security often
leads to user frustration [18]. While affect states im-
pact decisions, they also influence cognition [28].
Affect states enable recall of mood congruent in-
formation that might influence judgments, or the
heuristic adopted to make decisions [6].
In addition the active regulation of emotion or
mood deplete self-control resources and invoke ego
depletion [2]. Regulating affect often requires the
individual to overcome the innate tendency to dis-
play emotions while negative affect, induced by de-
manding and frustrating tasks, is implicated in de-
velopment of ego depletion.
3 Method
3.1 Participants
The sample consisted of university students, N =
100, of which 50 were women. The mean age was
28.18 years (SD = 5.241) for the 83 participants
who revealed their age. The participants were bal-
anced by gender and assigned randomly to either
the depletion (n = 50) or control (n = 50) condi-
tion. They were mostly non-computer science stu-
dents from Newcastle and Northumbria University,
of mainly international background (common coun-
tries included Oman, China and Iraq). Tiredness
and cognitive depletion over the course of a day
are affected by the participants’ circadian rhythm.
Hence to control the confounds of the circadian
rhythm, the experiment runs were balanced in time-
of-day for depletion (M = 4.167, SD = 1.403) and
control (M = 4.167, SD = 1.642) conditions. We
ran a Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the two condi-
tions matched by time of day. We find that the distri-
bution of participants across the two groups was not
statistically different, with Z = 0.00 and p= 1.00.
3.2 Procedure
The experiment was designed to enable a compari-
son of the influence of cognitive depletion on pass-
word strength. The experiment group was artifi-
cially cognitively depleted with tasks that required
impulse control while the control group was not de-
pleted, completing non-depleting tasks with similar
length and flavour.
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The procedure consisted of (a) pre-task ques-
tionnaires for demographics and personality traits,
(b) a manipulation to induce cognitive depletion,
(c) a manipulation check on the level of depletion,
(d) a password entry for a mock-up GMail registra-
tion, and (e) a debriefing and memorability check
one week after the task with a GMail login mockup.
Figure 1 depicts the experiment design.
3.2.1 GMail Registration Task
Participants were asked to generate a new password
for a Google Mail (GMail) account, on a mock-up
page which was visually identical to a GMail reg-
istration. The participants were told (a) to create
the account carefully and fill in all the fields; (b) to
give correct and valid information; (c) that the ac-
count is highly important; and (d) that they should
ensure they can remember the password. Partici-
pants were also asked to return to the lab one week
after the registration task. Registered e-mail address
and password were recorded. The strength of the
password was measured.
3.2.2 Inducing Cognitive Depletion
We induce cognitive depletion for the experiment
condition, reproducing manipulation components of
Baumeister et al. [31]. In the experiment condi-
tion, the participants are asked to suppress thoughts,
control impulses to follow a learned routine and to
execute a cognitively effortful Stroop task. In the
control condition, the participants fulfil tasks with a
similar structure, flavor and length, however with-
out the depleting conditions.
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, we expect partici-
pants in the experiment condition to be affected by
the induction of cognitive effort to differing degrees.
Especially the implicit theories about willpower
have been shown to have a significant effect on cog-
nitive depletion [20]. Consequently, we will control
the strength of the manipulation with a manipula-
tion check based on a brief mood inventory (Sec-
tion 3.3.2) evaluated in the Results Section 4.1.
1. Thought supression task. In the experiment
condition, the participants are shown a lot white
bear and asked not to think of the white bear, a
procedure following Wegner et al. [33]. They are
to raise their hand should they have thought of the
white bear and failed to suppress the thought. In
the control condition, the participants are asked to
record whenever they think about a white bear, but
not instructed suppress it. The control condition, is
not cognitively depleting as the participants do not
need to suppress their thoughts.
2. Impulse control task. This task is adapted from
Muraven et al. [26]. Participants are asked to cross
out all letters ’e’ in a complex statistical text for five
minutes. This establishes a learned routine. Then
the participants are given another statistical text. In
the experiment condition, the participants are asked
to follow a new rule, to cross out all letters ‘e’ unless
they are adjacent to a vowel. This rule interferes
with the learned routine and asks the participants to
exercise impulse control on it, which is depleting.
In the control condition, the participants are asked
to follow the same routine to cross out all letters
‘e’. This rule does not require impulse control and
is thereby non-depleting.
3. Cognitively effortful task. We used the Stroop
task [30] as cognitively effortful task. Participants
are asked to voice the printed color of a color word.
The Stroop condition is that the name of a color
(e.g., ‘red’) is printed in a color not denoted by the
name (incongruent color and name). This task is
a cognitively effortful when the Stroop condition
is fulfilled. The experiment condition involved an-
swering 10 Stroop items with the Stroop condition.
The control condition involved answering 10 items
without Stroop condition.
3.3 Measures
3.3.1 Password Strength
We tested multiple password meters, such as the Mi-
crosoft password meter and finally settled for the
password meter Web site1 because it uses an inter-
val scale and makes the components of the pass-
word score transparent. Each component, such as
‘number of characters’ or presence of ‘numbers’,
gives a bonus or malus for the overall score. All
1http://www.passwordmeter.com
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Figure 1: Overview of the experiment procedure. The control group did manipulation tasks with similar
structure and flavor, yet without the depleting condition.
component scores were recorded individually and
their sum computed as password score. Whereas the
password meter itself caps the scores at 0 and 100,
our final score could be negative or greater than 100.
The password meter does not account for weak-
nesses such as the use of dictionary words or per-
sonal identifiable information (e.g., name, user-
name) as part of the password. By the NIST
password guidance [7], those conditions, especially
failing the dictionary test, make weak passwords.
Hence, we adjusted the obtained password scores
with penalties if the password contained:
• an unmodified dictionary word (-25),
• part of the user’s real name (-50),
• the username (-50), or
• the user’s student id (-50).
The dictionary words we checked were the large list
of the Openwall wordlist collection2, intended pri-
marily for use with password crackers such as John
the Ripper and with password recovery utilities. For
the username, we argue that this information is often
at the disposal of an adversary in offline attacks. For
instance, for the Linux /etc/passwd file, the user-
name is the first field of each entry, the real name
in often encoded in the comment field. We obtain
a final password strength score on an interval scale,
with values between -100 and 150. The password
2http://www.openwall.com/wordlists/
strength obtained from this procedure was nearly
normally distributed across the participants.
In addition to the password meter score, we eval-
uated the NIST password entropy according to the
heuristic given in the NIST Special Publication 800-
63 [7] and submitted the passwords to the CMU
Password Guessability Service (PGS) [24], however
both methods offered limited differentiation across
the range of password strengths.
3.3.2 Brief Mood Inventory
Earlier research found that cognitive depletion can
be checked with a brief mood inventory, either the
Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS) [25, 2] or
a short form. We use a short form of a brief mood
inventory used as manipulation check in Baumeis-
ter’s research [31], including the dimensions (a) ex-
cited, (b) thoughtful, (c) tired, (d) happy, (e) worn
out, (f) sad, (g) angry, (h) calm, rated on 5-point
Likert-type items between 1 Disagree strongly and
5 Agree strongly, with 3 Neither agree nor disagree
as central point. Baumeister el al. [31] found that
tiredness and feeling worn out are significantly af-
fected by cognitive depletion and can therefore be
used as self-report manipulation check.
3.3.3 Big Five Inventory
The personality traits of the users were queried with
a 60-item Berkeley Big Five Inventory (BFI) [14,
21, 22]. The inventory measures the traits (a) Open-
ness to experience, (b) Conscientiousness, (c) Ex-
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traversion, (d) Agreeableness, and (e) Neuroticism,
with a 5-point Likert-type items between 1 Disagree
strongly and 5 Agree strongly computing the scores
as means of items for each domain.
4 Results
All inferential statistics are computed with two-
tailed tests and at an alpha level of .05.
4.1 Manipulation Check
We used the brief mood inventory introduced
in Section 3.3.2 as manipulation check on the
cognitive depletion, following a methodology of
Baumeister et al. [31].
A comparison across groups on tired and worn
out suggested that the manipulation was successful
(Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, tired: U = 368,Z =
−6.299, significance p = .000 < .05; worn out:
U = 669, Z=−4.145, significance p= .000< .05).
As expected following Baumeister et al. [31] in the
use of the brief mood inventory: the moods of feel-
ing tired and feeling worn out were found to be sig-
nificantly higher in the depleted group than in the
control group. The effect size of the manipulation
for reporting feeling tired is r = 0.63 and for feel-
ing being worn out is r = 0.42. That constitutes a
large effect on feeling tired and a medium to large
effect on feeling worn out. Consequently, we reject
the null hypothesis that the control and experiment
group are equally depleted across conditions. This
suggests that the cognitive depletion of the partici-
pants has been induced by the manipulation.
4.2 Password Strength Score
The distribution of the Passwordmeter password
strength score is measured on interval level and is
not significantly different from a normal distribu-
tion, Saphiro-Wilk, W (100) = 1, p = .652. The
distribution of the Password Guessability Service
(PGS) results are measured on interval level and
significantly different from a normal distribution,
Saphiro-Wilk,W (100) = .0.921, p< .001. We con-
tinue the analysis with the Passwordmeter password
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Figure 2: Visual inspection of the distribution as-
sumptions on the sampled password strength scores.
strength score. Figure 2 given an overview of the vi-
sual inspection of the password strength scores. It
contains a histogram in comparison with the normal
distribution, the probability density estimate and the
QQ-plot between the sample data and the theoreti-
cal distribution. We computed Levene’s test for
the homogeneity of variances. For the password
meter scores, the variances were not significantly
unequal (a) for experiment and control condition,
F(1,98) = 3.369, p = .069 > .05, and for (b) for
gender, F(1,98) = 1.378, p= .243 > .05.
Univariate Analysis of Variance (GLM). We con-
ducted a Univariate Analysis of Variance (GLM)
with Type III Sums of Squares—robust against un-
equal sample sizes—with password strength as de-
pendent variable. We used condition, gender and
the Brief Mood Inventory (BMI) items as fixed vari-
ables, the Big Five Inventory (BFI) as covariates.
(a) There was a significant effect of gender,
F(1,60) = 6.824, p = .011, partial η2 = .102.
(b) We observed a significant effect of BMI Tired,
F(4,60) = 3.687, p = .009, partial η2 = .197.
(c) BMI Calm had a significant effect, F(4,60) =
4.264, p= .004, partial η2 = .221. Other factors did
not show significant effects. The corrected model
offered a variance explained of R2 = .533 (adjusted
R2 = .229).
4.3 Automated Linear Regression.
The impact on the password strength score was ana-
lyzed with a multi-predictor forward stepwise linear
regression. The linear regression has an adjusted
R2 = .206. The studentized residual was close to
a normal distribution. The outcomes of the gen-
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der, Big Five (5) and brief mood inventory (8) were
predictors on the password strength score as target
variable. The gender did not have a significant ef-
fect in the linear regression. We provide the effects,
effect sizes (η2 and ω2) and coefficients of the lin-
ear regression in Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix.
Section 4.4 contains the posthoc power analysis for
this regression. We give details of the automated
data preparation of the regression first and will sub-
sequently describe the effects in decreasing order of
predictor importance.
Depletion Level from Brief Mood Inventory The
SPSS automated data preparation of the linear re-
gression merged categories of BMI Tired to max-
imise the association with the target. Table 4
in the Appendix contains an exact overview of
the SPSS automated data preparation. We accept
this grouping and name the cases introduced by
SPSS and call it the depletion level of (a) non-
depleted, (b) effortful, and (c) depleted. Strongly
disagree, disagree slightly and neither agree nor
disagree were grouped as BMI Tired T = 0. We
label this case as depletion level non-depleted. The
agree slightly of BMI Tired was transformed into
BMI Tired T= 1, which we label as depletion level
effortful. BMI Tired of Agree strongly was trans-
formed into BMI Tired T = 2, which we label as
depletion level depleted.
We evaluated the derived depletion level as vari-
able for further analysis. First, we evaluated Lev-
ene’s test for the homogeneity of variances. For
the password meter scores, the variances were not
significantly unequal for depletion level, F(2,97) =
1.997, p= .141 > .05.
A One-way ANOVA was computed with the
password strength score as dependent variable.
There was a significant effect of the depletion level
on the password strength, F(2,97) = 5.449, p =
.006 < .05. We observe a medium to large effect
size: η2 = 0.10. As the ANOVA was computed
with unequal sample sizes, we employed Scheffe´
and Games-Howell as robust post-hoc tests. Scheffe´
uses the harmonic mean sample size 18.335. Both
Scheffe´ and Games-Howell reported the depleted
case significantly different from the effortful case,
Scheffe´ p = .006 < .05 and Games-Howell p =
.036 < .05. Neither of the tests found a significant
difference between the non-depleted and the other
two cases.
Accepting the grouping of the SPSS automated
data preparation, we have: Of the control group, 49
participants were consequently rated non-depleted;
0 participants were rated as effortful; 1 participant
was rated as depleted. Of the experiment group,
23 participants were rated non-depleted; 17 partic-
ipants were rated as effortful; 10 participants were
rated as depleted. Table 1 contains an overview of
descriptive statistics over these groups.
On this grouping, we observe an odds ratio that a
participant is fully depleted of
ORdepleted = 12.25 95% CI [1.5,99.8].
The odds ratio be being somewhat affected by de-
pletion (i.e., effortful and depleted combined) is:
OR¬non−depleted = 57.52 95% CI [7.36,449.75].
Effects of Cognitive Depletion. The depletion
level was indeed the most important predictor in
the regression (significance p = .001 < .05, pre-
dictor importance= .371). The depletion level
was recoded to make the non-depleted condition the
baseline.3 The effortful level, that is only slightly
depleted, had a coefficient of 19.027 (significance
p = .044 < .05). The depleted level had a coeffi-
cient of −31.623 (significance p= .006 < .05). We
observe a medium effect size of the depletion level,
ω2 = .097. Consequently, we reject the null hypoth-
esis.
We summarize the descriptive statistics of pass-
word strength score by depletion level in Table 1
and depict them in Figure 3.
The descriptive statistics on password guessabil-
ity determined by PGS show the same overall out-
come in terms of means of password guesses as well
as percentage of passwords determined as unguess-
able (cf. Table 2). The proportional difference of
PGS unguessable passwords across depletion level
3The LASER paper [15] reported coefficients with the de-
pleted condition as baseline. Otherwise, both analyzes are
equivalent.
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was significant (Fischer Exact Test, two-tailed, p=
.033 < .05).
We evaluate the effect size of the number of
unguessable passwords with odds ratios. Compar-
ing the cases effortful and depleted pairwise against
non-depleted we have the following odds ratios of
number of unguessable passwords:
OReffortful = 3.62 95% CI [1.18,11.06]
ORdepleted = 0.41 95% CI [0.05,3.45].
Effects of Mood. BMI Thoughtfulness and Calm-
ness had significant effects. Strong disagreement
to thoughtfulness implied stronger passwords (sig-
nificance p = .018 < .05, predictor importance =
.251, coefficient 40.072). Strong disagreement to
calmness implied stronger passwords (significance
p = .012 < .05, predictor importance = .172, co-
efficient 38.799). Both BMI Thoughtfulness and
Calmness constitute small effects, at ω2 = .052 and
ω2 = .044.
Effects of Personality Traits. Of the Big Five
personality traits, the BFI Agreeableness score
was the most important predictor on the password
strength (significance p= .025 < .05, predictor im-
portance = .137, coefficient 14.649), where higher
agreeableness significantly implied stronger pass-
words. The BFI Extraversion was a notable yet non-
significant negative predictor on password strength
(significance p = .108 > .05, predictor importance
= .069, coefficient −11.538). Both BFI Agreeable-
ness and Extraversion constitute small effects, at
ω2 = .034 and ω2 = .013.
4.4 Power Analysis
All power analyses are computed with G*Power
3.1 [11], aiming at a significance level of α = .05.
A Priori Power. We conducted an a priori
power analysis for F-Tests with Omnibus One-Way
ANOVA. We intended detect at least a medium ef-
fect size f = 0.25 of cognitive depletion on pass-
word strength with a power of 80%. This scenario
implies a sample size on the order of 128 partici-
pants.
We have elected to use a constrained random as-
signment with balanced gender and balanced time
of day for the lab appointments to control variabil-
ity introduced by those factors.
5 Discussion
This study applied the methodology of previous
cognitive depletion studies [3, 2, 20, 31] to a ubiqui-
tous security context. We observe that cognitive ef-
fort is a major predictor of password strength. Mod-
erate cognitive exertion leads to stronger passwords
than in an non-depleted and in depleted states.
Strong depletion leads to weaker passwords than in
moderate exertion and non-depleted states.
This is in accord with Kahneman’s observation
that initial effortful activity introduces a bias to-
wards exerting further cognitive effort [23]. This
outcome can also be explained with Selye’s arousal
curve [9], an inverse U-shaped relation between the
activity of the stress system and the quality of a
human’s performance, yielding an optimum perfor-
mance under moderate stress. This result vouches
for further investigation, in particular to what extent
this observation can be operationalized to improve
the quality of password choice.
Our analysis also showed the impact of mood
and personality, hence indicates the importance of
studying other human dimensions. The results on
the brief mood inventory are surprising in them-
selves, in particular because participants who re-
ported themselves as not thoughtful or not calm
chose better passwords. This result can substantiate
the explanation of Selye’s arousal curve as a possi-
ble explanation. In any case, these results ask for
the investigation of the influence of current stress
and mood on password choice, in particular whether
negative emotions such as fear are involved.
For personality traits, it is plausible that BFI
Agreeableness has an impact on the password
strength, because the NEO PI classifies Compliance
one of its facets, and hence postulates a tendency to
avoid conflict and cooperate. Therefore, we assume
users with high agreeableness to comply to pass-
word policies, as well. However, the results on the
BFI ask for further investigation, as the experiment
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of password strength via password meter by condition and depletion level.
Condition Depletion Level N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error Min Max
Control
Non-depleted 49 40.65 30.97 4.43 -45 121
Depleted 1 16.00 - - 16 16
Total 50 40.16 30.87 4.37 -45 121
Experiment
Non-depleted 23 33.30 33.81 7.05 -19 102
Effortful 17 57.12 45.07 10.93 -24 138
Depleted 10 11.10 45.97 14.54 -64 70
Total 50 36.96 42.99 6.08 -64 138
Total 100 38.56 37.27 3.73 -64 138
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of password guessability determined by the CMU Password Guessability
Service (PGS) by condition and depletion level. PGS declares passwords “unguessable” at 2.E+13 guessing
attempts.
Condition Depletion Level N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error Unguessable Pwds % (#)
Control
Non-depleted 49 4.85E+12 7.19E+12 1.03E+12 22.4% (11)
Depleted 1 40945471 - - 0% (0)
Total 50 4.75E+12 7.15E+12 1.01E+12 22% (11)
Experiment
Non-depleted 23 2.37E+12 5.69E+12 1.19E+12 13%(3)
Effortful 17 7.83E+12 8.49E+12 2.06E+12 47.1% (8)
Depleted 10 1.71E+12 5.22E+12 1.65E+12 9.1% (1)
Total 50 4.09E+12 7.11E+12 1.01E+12 24% (12)
Total 100 4.42E+12 7.10E+11 7.10+11 23% (23)
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Figure 3: Boxplots of the password strength score by depletion level and experiment condition. The diamond
shows the group mean. 49 participants of the control condition were non-depleted, one participant was
depleted. 23 participants of the experiment condition were non-depleted, 17 classified as effortful, 10 as
depleted.
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cannot distinguish whether the participants sought
to please the experimenter, constituting a confound-
ing variable, or whether the effect of compliance
persists in real-world scenarios. It is notable that
BFI Conscientiousness, the tendency to show self-
discipline and be dutiful, did not have a significant
effect on the password strength.
5.1 Ethics
The experiment followed the ethical guidelines of
the university and has received ethical approval.
The participants were informed that personal iden-
tifiable data will be stored in hard and soft copy and
have consented to the experiment procedures. The
participants were informed of the rough experiment
effort and the requirement to come back to the lab
in a week, before choosing to participate. The par-
ticipants were paid a time compensation of $15 for
partial completion and $23 for completing all com-
ponents of the experiment. The participants data
in hard and soft copy was stored securely in an of-
fice under lock and key, on stationary machines or
laptops with full hard disk encryption. The partic-
ipants passwords were stripped from username and
other PII before being uploaded to CMU’s Password
Guessability Service (PGS). The data was deleted
from CMU’s servers after 14 days.
5.2 Ecological Validity
We developed a mockup of GMail, which was visu-
ally identical to GMail’s account registration page.
In this sense the experiment is generalisable to real-
life settings. Even though the experimenter did not
disclose that the GMail registration was a mockup,
we cannot exclude that participants might have no-
ticed that it was not the real GMail registration page.
The experiment included a memorability check for
which the participants were asked to return to the
lab one week after the registration task. They were
to enter the set password in a GMail login mockup.
The participants were made aware of this require-
ment in the initial pre-experiment briefing.
5.3 Limitations
We account for limitations of the given experiment
and offer mitigation options for future experiments
where appropriate.
Experiment Design. Whereas the experiment
was balanced in that the participants of experiment
and control group did manipulation tasks of similar
structure that only differed in the depletion condi-
tion, the experiment was not designed to be double-
blind. The experimenter knew which condition the
participants were in. Future experiments can use a
second experimenter for the tasks after the manipu-
lation unaware of the depletion state.
Strength of Manipulation. Even if the effect
size of the manipulation in odds ratio was note-
worthy at ORdepleted = 12.25, the absolute num-
ber of participants that reported strong depletion
was low (n = 11). Future experiments will need to
achieve stronger depletion throughout and manipu-
late a slight cognitive effort stimulus deliberately.
The cognitive depletion manipulation was only
partially successful with 28 participants out of 50
reporting slight or strong agreement with tiredness.
The effect size for at least some reported depletion
in odds ratio was OR¬non−depleted = 57.52. Ear-
lier studies, such as [20] used 48 Stroop task items,
while our study only contained 10 items. Future ex-
periments can increase the cognitive effort by in-
creasing the number Stroop task items.
Unequal Sample Sizes. Due to the differing im-
pact of the manipulation on the participants, the
grouping by depletion level yielded unequal sam-
ple sizes. This could have confounded analysis
with One-way ANOVA. Consequently, we have em-
ployed an Univariate Analysis of Variance with
Type III Sums of Squares robust in this situation.
Alternative approaches with random re-sampling to
groups with equal sample sizes agreed to the analy-
sis outcomes.
Low granularity on depletion levels. Depletion
levels have only been differentiated on a 5-point
Likert-type scale. Further categorisation of these
levels will be beneficial to investigate when cogni-
tive effort promotes or inhibits security behaviour.
Future experiments can mitigate this limitation with
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Table 3: Correlation of password strength metrics.
Passwordmeter Zxcvbn PGS
Passwordmeter .43 .46
Zxcvbn .43 .58
PGS .46 .58
either a 9-point Likert-type scale or a Visual Ana-
logue Scale (VAS).
Future experiments could be further improved
with an invasive post-task cognitive depletion ma-
nipulation check, such as a long Stroop Task count-
ing the number of errors. Placed after the ex-
periment task, additional depletion inflicted by the
Stroop Task would not contaminate the measure-
ment in the control group.
Password measures. The password strength mea-
surements considered in this study all come with
weaknesses: The password meter has limitations
in being purely heuristic. The other two measures
lack in differentiation across the range of password
strengths. The NIST entropy estimate only offers
a low differentiation between password strengths.
The results of the CMU Password Guessability Ser-
vice (PGS) are not normally distributed and come
with a static cut-off at which the service considers a
password “unguessable”, conflating the strengths of
secure passwords to a single value.
As a further password strength measurement
tool, we considered Zxcvbn, which also measures
the likely number of guesses an adversary will
need to crack the password. We have compared
the three tools passwordmeter.net (NIST-corrected
score), PGS and Zxcvbn (both log10 number of
guesses) and found that their results are only to
some extent pair-wise correlated. A correlation ma-
trix with Pearson’s correlation coefficients showed
statistically significant results. Table 3 shows the
correlation matrix between the different password
strength metrics tested, while Figure 4 contains the
scatter plots with regression lines.
Newly created vs. reused password. Not all par-
ticipants created a new password. However, we
asked participants in the post-study questionnaire
whether they created a new password or whether
they reused an existing password. There was a no-
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Figure 4: Scatterplots with regression lines and 95%
CI for different password metrics.
ticeable difference across depletion levels, where
the effortful condition had the highest proportion of
reused password. However, the difference in pro-
portions across depletion levels was not statistically
significant, p= .215, Fischer Exact Test.
Low Adjusted R2 in Linear Regression. The ad-
justed R2 = .206, hence the automated linear regres-
sion accounts for 20.6% of the variability, adjusted
for the number of predictors in the model. We ob-
serve that the variability in the experiment group as
well as in the participants with a depletion level of
effortful or depleted was higher than in the control
group.
6 Conclusion
We offer the first comprehensive study of cogni-
tive effort and depletion in a security context. We
conclude that cognitive effort is a necessary condi-
tion for the creation of strong passwords, which in
turn implies an involvement of System 2 in terms
of the dual-process model. It is an intriguing ob-
servation that slight cognitive effort improves pass-
word strength and that cognitive depletion dimin-
ishes password strength. It has far-reaching conse-
quences for the design of password user interfaces
and password policies. First, we observe that the
user’s cognitive effort and depletion may be more
important than solely concentrating on password
complexity requirements. Second, the user’s cog-
nitive depletion may yield an alternative explana-
tion for and substantiate earlier research on the se-
curity compliance budget [4]. Third, our investi-
gations indicate practical amendments to password
policies (“Only set a new password when you feel
12
fresh and awake.”) and possible HCI interventions
to strengthen password behavior (e.g., by inducing
cognitive effort before the password generation).
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A Corrections and Changes
A.1 Correction on Saphiro-Wilk on
Password Strength [2019/01/16]
In Section 4.2 “Password Strength Score” of the
published LASER’16 paper [15], we reported for
the password meter “D(100) = .99, p= .652” men-
tioning it being greater than the significance level
as well as for PGS log10 guesses “D(100) = .59,”
reporting a triple-zero p-value.
Those tests were misreported and flagged in an
analysis with the R package statcheck after the
camera-ready submission.
We recomputed them on the original dataset with
the following outcome: For the password meter we
have Shapiro-Wilk W (100) = 1, p= .652; for PGS
log10 guesses we have Saphiro-Wilk, W (100) =
.0.921, p < .001. These corrections do not change
the conclusions drawn from the tests.
No further statcheck errors were found.
A.2 Power Observed [2019/01/16]
An earlier version of extended technical report con-
tained a post-hoc power and positive predictive
value (PPV) consideration. We removed the post-
hoc discussion as we could not reliably quantify
power loss due to, e.g., unequal group sizes, and
retained the results of the original a priori power
analysis as reported.
B Thoughts on Replication Attempts
We invite and aim at supporting replication attempts
of this work. We offer some thoughts in hindsight,
how replications could be informed.
Evidence on the Limited Strength Model. It is
beneficial to consider the evidence available in psy-
chology to this date. In 2010, Hagger et al. [17]
conducted a systematic meta analysis of 83 studies
testing the effect of ego depletion. As overall ef-
fect of cognitive depletion, the study found an av-
eraged corrected standardized mean difference of
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Table 4: Automated data preparation of the Automated Forward Stepwise Linear Regression: The auto-
mated data preparation has merged categories to maximize association with the target password strength for
BMI Thoughtful, BMI Tired, BMI Wornout, BMI Calm.
Transformed Field Label Included Original Categories
BMI Tired T = 0 Non-depleted Disagree strongly, disagree a little, neither agree nor disagree
BMI Tired T = 1 Effortful Agree a little
BMI Tired T = 2 Depleted Agree strongly
BMI Thoughtful T = 0 Disagree strongly
BMI Thoughtful T = 1 Disagree a little
BMI Thoughtful T = 2 Neither agree nor disagree, agree a little
BMI Thoughtful T = 3 Agree strongly
BMI Calm T = 0 Disagree strongly
BMI Calm T = 1 Disagree a little, neither agree nor disagree, agree a little, agree strongly
Table 5: Effects of the Automated Forward Stepwise Linear Regression.
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Imp. η2 ω2
Corrected Model 37,143.052 8 4,642.882 4.210 < .001
BMI Tired T 15,580.722 2 7,790.361 7.065 .001 .371 .113 .097
BMI Thoughtful T 10,516.094 3 3,505.365 3.179 .028 .251 .076 .052
BMI Calm T 7,197.450 1 7,197.450 6.527 .012 .172 .052 .044
BFI Agreeableness 5,749.695 1 5,749.695 5.214 .025 .137 .042 .034
BFI Extraversion 2,897.897 1 2,897.897 2.628 .108 .069 .021 .013
Residual 100,349.588 91 1,102.743
Corrected Total 137,492.640 99
Note: R2 = .27, adjusted R2 = 0.206, Akaike Information Criterion Corrected = 711.125.
Table 6: Coefficients of the Automated Forward Stepwise Linear Regression. The coefficients
BMI Tired T = 2, BMI Thoughtful T = 3 and BMI Calm = 1 have been set to zero because they are re-
dundant. Note that the depletion level has been recoded in this technical report to make the non-depleted
condition the baseline. Consequently, the effects reported here differ from the short LASER paper [15].
Model Term Label Coef. Std. Err. t Sig. 95% Conf. Interval Imp.
Lower Upper
Intercept 3.559 35.561 0.1 .920 -67.078 74.197
BMI Tired T = 1 effortful 19.027 9.318 2.024 .044 0.517 37.536 .371
BMI Tired T = 2 depleted -31.623 11.331 -2.791 .006 -54.132 -9.115 .371
BMI Thoughtful T = 0 40.072 16.704 2.399 .018 6.892 73.252 .251
BMI Thoughtful T = 2 19.405 8.514 2.279 .025 2.493 36.318 .251
BMI Calm T = 0 38.799 15.187 2.555 .012 8.632 68.967 .172
BFI Agreeableness 14.649 6.415 2.283 .025 1.906 27.392 .137
BFI Extraversion -11.538 7.117 -1.621 .108 -25.675 2.600 .069
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d+ = 0.62, 95% CI [0.57,0.67]. The reported ef-
fect sizes are aligned with the assumptions we have
made in our a priori power analysis.
However, Carter and McCullough [8] indicated in
2014 that the field of ego depletion research shows
strong signals of publication bias. The paper notes
the presence of small-study effects and the danger
of overestimating effect sizes as a result. The au-
thors report a conspicuous lack of statistically non-
significant findings.
Finally, we consider the 2016 multilab preregis-
tered replication attempt of Baumeister’s ego de-
pletion work [16].4 The replication attempt re-
ported a summary effect of Cohen’s d = 0.04, 95%
CI [−0.07,0.15]. Given that our LASER’16 study
sought to apply instruments used in Baumeister’s
work, e.g., [31], the low effect size observed in a
large-scale replication (N = 2,141) asks us to be
prudent. This prudence includes not only cognitive
depletion as a phenomenon, but also the manipula-
tion and manipulation-check instruments used.
Manipulation Instruments. Hagger et al. [16]
included a systematic meta analysis of manipula-
tion instruments used in its appendix, overlapping
with the instruments used in our study. Hence, ex-
pected effect sizes for manipulation checks can be
well-informed from their work.
Manipulation Check Instruments. We would
find it advisable to use well-established and vetted
manipulation check for cognitive depletion, where
we have used Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) in this
context after the LASER’16 publication. The Brief
Mood Inventory (BMI) variant we used could well
be replaced with a measurement instrument with fi-
delity to our research intention, while obtaining a
more accurate manipulation check.
One subtlety to consider here is that measures of
cognitive depletion are often also inducing cogni-
tive effort. For that reason, Baumeister’s proposal
of a Brief Mood Inventory as a proxy for cognitive
depletion holds some appeal as pre-task manipula-
tion check. However, a cognitively effortful mea-
4Replication OSF Repository: https://osf.io/jymhe/
surement instrument, such as counting errors on a
defined battery of Stroop tasks (cf., Job et al [20]),
could be employed after the password choice task.
In that case, the cognitive effort induced by the mea-
surement would not confound the task any longer,
while offering a measurement how much cognitive
depletion was still present at the end of the password
choice task.
Password Strength Measures. Finally, in subse-
quent studies on the effects of stress and fear on
password choice [13], we considered other outcome
measures. We concluded that the password meter
metric used in this study and the Password Guess-
ability Services (PGS) make it more challenging
to replicate the study, because we have no control
over the current version available to future replica-
tions. Consequently, we decided for zxcvbn [34]
log10 guesses as metric, yielding the advantage that
we could store the exact zxcvbn version used in
the study and that the dictionaries used by zxcvbn
could be externalized. While log10 guesses mea-
sures a different construct than a linear password
meter heuristic score, we found in our studies that
the resulting variables are well correlated.
Power. The effect size observed in the large-scale
replication is clearly lower than the one we as-
sumed in our a priori power analysis (correspond-
ing to a medium-effect two-tailed sensitivity (Co-
hen’s d = 0.566) at 80% power under equal-sized
and normally-distributed groups). Given the effect
size estimates observed in the recent replications,
we would aim at a study powered for a small effect
size.
Analysis Methods. We note that the automated
data preparation of the SPSS Automated Forward
Stepwise Linear Regression introduced a grouping
used in our analysis. We would find it a sound
change to introduce three conditions in the manipu-
lation (undepleted, effortful, and depleted) a priori
through well-defined and controlled levels of expo-
sure to cognitively effortful tasks, instead.
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